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# Islamophobia Security K

Discussions of representations are a prerequisite to argumentation.CRAWFORD 02

[Neta, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at Boston University, “Argument and Change in World Politics”, p. 19-21]

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand (the proper frame or representation) must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger Karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively represent situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibilities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representationhow frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

Islamophobia is an unproductive master signifier – establishing it as the explanation for anti-Muslim violence and thing to be resisted is inaccurate, prevents recognizing deeper foundations and causes and implies it’s self-constructing. **Ahmad[[1]](#footnote-1)**

However, as Maussen points out, there are important theoretical reservations for the use of the catch-all term Islamophobia to encompass so many diverse phenomena. Primarily, the term “groups together all kinds of different forms of discourse, speech and acts, by suggesting that they all emanate from an identical ideological core, which is a ‘fear’ or a ‘phobia’ of Islam.” This amounts to a form of ideological reductionism which, however, fails to offer any further or deeper explanation of why this irrational fear of Islam has come about, and how it refracts through myriad different social structures into such a wide array of different exclusionary behaviours and processes. Thus, Maussen notes that while “these different kinds of discourse and speech” – such as negative media portrayals of Muslims, legislation impacting primarily or inordinately on Muslims, and sporadic acts of public violence against Muslims – may well be “related and feed into one another, but we cannot simply equate them all and treat them as comparable illustrations of a core ideology named ‘Islamophobia.’” There is therefore a need to “distinguish speech and discourse on the one hand, from acts on the other hand.” While discourse and speech may be demeaning, it should not be conflated with “policies which limit the religious freedoms of Muslims, or with acts of violence, such as burning mosques or attacking Muslim girls who wear the headscarf.”21 This sort of critical evaluation of the application of the term Islamophobia raises important issues highlighting the underdevelopment of the concept as a sociological category capable of providing a credible theoretical explanatory framework by which to understand the diverse phenomena of anti- Muslim hostility and discrimination. Clearly, while there may be compelling reason to conclude that many of these phenomena are indeed motivated by a general irrational fear of Islam and Muslims – the causal origins of this irrational mindset are largely ignored in the literature that endorses the concept of Islamophobia. Furthermore, if such an ideological mindset is presumed to be the fundamental problem, how this mindset manages to encompass such a diversity of processes, institutions and behaviours not only in a single society, but indeed across multiple societies simultaneously, remains unexplained. In effect, Islamophobia becomes a self-reinforcing circular concept, in which anti-Muslim hostility is generated by nothing more than an irrational hostility toward Muslims – effectively, Islamophobia creates Islamophobia.

This link is an independent discourse argument if I win any other factors explain the rise of Islamophobia – the AC’s performance and method make it impossible to address those causes or even understand what you’re addressing.

You can’t understand Islamophobia apart from securitization – it’s constructed by the need to securitize areas of the globe to guarantee Western interest. **Ahmad 2**

Furthermore, Muslim communities – both in the form of diasporas in the West and Muslim-majority countries in strategic regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa – are perceived to cut across the faultlines of increasingly complex non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, energy depletion, water shortages and food insecurity. A recent US Army War College study makes reference to Huntington’s clash thesis, arguing that while it “captured the possibilities” already emerging in the 1990s: “... the future and its implications are even darker than what Professor Huntington suggested.... The confluence between the world’s greatest reserves of petroleum and the extraordinary difficulties that the Islamic world is having, and will continue to have, in confronting a civilization that has taken the West 900 years to develop will create challenges that strategists are only now beginning to grasp.”46 In other words, there is a direct link between Western energy interests, the “War on Terror”, and the West’s military pre-occupation with the Muslim world. For example, the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of “the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents”, the report concludes that “The implications for future conflict are ominous.”47 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: “In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s”, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. “Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.”48 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable “youth bulge” by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent, and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to “endemic unemployment” will be channelled through “political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces.”49 The Exclusionary Logic of Securitization Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrates how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order – that is, who are anathema to imperial interests. Due to the geopolitical significance of Muslim-majority regions to imperial interests and their links to Muslim diasporas in the West, this securitization process overwhelmingly focuses on the externalisation of Muslims. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of Islamophobia is insufficient to understand its causal dynamics. For the mere identification of a security issue does not necessarily corresponding to an objective threat, but represents the interests of power. This also means that the state of exception cannot simply be unilaterally decreed by the sovereign, but that the act of speech must conform to a normative grammar of security by a position of authority speaking to an audience that understands and is convinced by this act. Thus, the specific socio-political relations that lead to securitisation are under- theorised. As McDonald points out: “The potential for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations is not addressed, and the question of why particular representations resonate with relevant constituencies is under‐theorized.”50 He notes that questions like “Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and dynamics as threatening? What role do narratives of history, culture and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization?” are obscured.51 Yet answers to such questions must go beyond a form of discourse-reductionism focusing exclusively on “narratives of history, cultural and identity”, to explore the political economy with which these narratives are co-extensive. As Doug Stokes points out: “While the WoT [“War on Terror”] is undoubtedly a discursive complex whereby modes of representation about terrorism, non-Western populations and the construction of stark boundaries (you are either with us or with the terrorists) operate to exclude and include, it is also intimately bound up with political and economic processes... Specifically, the wars launched in the name of counter-terrorism are not purely driven by certain hegemonic discourses, but are also part of the West’s economic interests in oil, strategic interests in military bases in the Middle East and the desire to maintain American hegemony into the twenty-first century by controlling one of the crucial resource-rich regions for global capitalism.”52

However, that implies that there’s nothing particular about the Muslim that otherizes – even if the aff solves, it just accommodates the apparatus of security. The alternative is a rejection of security politics. **Neoclous ‘08[[2]](#footnote-2)**

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.

This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.

Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re- affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.

The link proves mutual exclusivity, and the alt solves the case. It rejects the logic that makes possible characterizations of the Other. Neoclous 2

For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

Regardless no perms in a method debate:

1. any perm is definitionally severance from a worldview since the combination is a new world view- the idea of perms only makes sense in the context of a policy action that ostensibly leaves the rest of the world unchanged

2. key to neg ground - what your method is is something you can keep unclear so you could permute anything, only way for us to debate or engage in method questions is for you to defend yours and not try to steal mine

3. Your offense is to the judge signing the ballot for you to endorse the movement- that’s an endorsement of your strategy instead of mine, and it’s a question of who they should endorse

plus it doesn't take anything away from you - if our methods really are the same in certain ways you can nonunique my offense

The War on Terrorism was justification for invasion of oil fields. Confirms my offense **Foster ‘08**[[3]](#footnote-3)

Militarily the issue was one of shoring up Saudi Arabia in the face of growing signs of instability, carrying out regime change in Iraq, and exerting maximum pressure on Iran. Key figures in the Bush administration such as Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz had been pushing for an invasion of Iraq even before the election. Once the September 2001 attacks occurred, the “War on Terrorism” led to the invasion first of Afghanistan, giving the United States a geopolitical doorway (and pipeline route) to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Basin, followed by the invasion in 2003 of Iraq. From the standpoint of the geopolitics of oil, Saddam Hussein’s removal and the occupation of Iraq was seen as enhancing the security of Middle East oil, presenting the possibility of a big boost in Iraqi oil production, and providing a staging ground for increased U.S. military, political, and economic dominance of the Gulf. U.S. strategic control of the Middle East and its oil was viewed as the key to establishing the basis of a “new American century.”

# AT AC

## T Good (Agonistic Pluralism)

Going for a prefiat rejection of T is inconsistent with their role of the ballot arguments. It just flips the script and continues to overdetermine what’s allowed in politics by a single interest. Instead, the judge should use agonistic pluralism – the terms of the debate should be a subject of debate rather than assumed by fiat. **Schaap ‘06[[4]](#footnote-4)**

Agonistic democrats, by contrast, draw attention to and affirm the centrality of conflict within democratic politics. While there are significant differences among theorists of agonistic democracy, what they share is a principled desire to leave more up to politics in the sense that citizens should be free to contest the terms of public life and the conditions of their political association.5 Agonistic democrats’ affirmation of the conflictual nature of democratic politics is motivated by a suspicion of attempts to determin[ing]e in advance what is to count as legitimate political action because [T]his too often becomes a way of coopting radical challenges to the dominant interests within a society. Rather than seeking to determine the basic principles that should govern democratic deliberation, agonistic democrats aim to understand democracy primarily in terms of an ethos which affirms the contingency and openness of political life. Following from this, rather than taking for granted commonality (i.e. the ‘fact’ of the demos or people) as a precondition for democratic deliberation, they emphasise the extent to which this commonality (the experience of a “we”) is a difficult, fragile and contingent achievement of political action.

*Prefer agonistic pluralism:*

*1.* Key to different perspectives coexisting in debate, otherwise they artificially privilege one group, which makes it essential to make the paradigm part of the debate. T is engagement and respect, not exclusion **Bleiker[[5]](#footnote-5)**

Two civic virtues are necessary, Connolly believes, to render a journey toward a pluralist notion of democracy feasible in practice. The ﬁrst is agonistic respect among multiple groups or individuals. This respect is necessary even when—indeed precisely when—these groups or individuals passionately disagree. Whereas the liberal notion of tolerance assumes a majority that occupies an authoritative center and bestows tolerance upon minorities, agonistic respect is operating when numerous interdependent minorities coexist[ing] and interact in a safe and respectful environment, thus generating and sustaining a form of common governance. “These interacting units share a number of rights and duties, chief among them a willingness to respect each other’s different faith or value system. Accepting difference, Connolly believes, should even include the recognition that each such value system, including one’s own, is and should in principle be contestable.”

*2. Conflict is inevitable, which means there’s no offense to a model that tries to shut it down. The question is whether we allow that contestation to be productive in the ways Schaap describes.* ***Honig[[6]](#footnote-6)***

To affirm the perpetuity of contest is *not to celebrate a world without points of stabilization; it is* to affirm *the* reality *of perpetual contest, even within an ordered setting,* and to identify the afﬁrmative dimensions of contestation. *It is to see that* the always imperfect closure of political space tends to engender remainders *and* that*, if those remainders are not engaged. they* may return to haunt and destabilize the *very* closures that deny their existence. *It is to treat rights and law as a part of political contest rather than as the instruments of its closure. lt is to see that* attempts to shut down the agon perpetually fail*, that the best (or worst) they do is to displace politics onto other sites and topics, where the struggle of identity and difference. resistance and closure. is then re- peated.” These are the platforms of a virui theory of politics.*

## Lex - Slacktivism

The ballot acts as a token, promoting slacktivism which precludes future support.

**Kristofferson et al. 13** [Kirk Kristofferson, Katherine White, John Peloza, researchers, “The Nature of Slacktivism: How the Social Observability of an Initial Act of Token Support Affects Subsequent Prosocial Action,” Journal of Consumer Research, 2013, no pp.]

Although intended as a satirical commentary, the above quote highlights what many assume is a prevalent behavior among consumers: slacktivism. We define slacktivism as a willingness to perform a relatively costless, token display of support for a social cause, with an accompanying lack of willingness to devote significant effort to enact meaningful change (Davis 2011; Morozov 2009a). A variety of factors, including the dramatic increase in social media presence among charitable organizations and advocacy groups, has made it increasingly easy for consumers to engage in small token acts of support for causes. However, one predominant criticism that has emerged is that this increased online presence has done little more than create a generation of “slacktivists” who will engage in token displays of support for a cause but are not likely to subsequently engage in more meaningful contributions to the cause (Morozov 2009b). The current research examines the conditions under which such “slacktivist” behavior occurs and proposes that the social observability of the initial act of token support can play an important moderating role. Consumers have multiple avenues open to them to engage in small token forms of support for an issue or cause. This can include signing a petition, wearing a bracelet or pin in support of a cause, or engaging in various forms of online support such as liking or joining a page on Facebook. We refer to these types of behaviors as token support because they allow consumers to affiliate with a cause in ways that show their support to themselves or others, with little associated effort or cost. We contrast token support with meaningful support, which we define as consumer contributions that require a significant cost, effort, or behavior change in ways that make tangible contributions to the cause. Examples of meaningful support include donating money and volunteering time and skills. Both marketing practice and empirical research generate competing predictions for how an initial act of token support for a cause has an impact on more meaningful subsequent forms of support. One perspective is supported by anecdotal evidence from media commentary reporting that consumers commonly behave in a “slacktivist” fashion by committing only to small, token acts of support, but not subsequently engaging in more meaningful forms of helping behaviors. This perspective is supported by empirical work on moral licensing (Khan and Dhar 2006). Moral licensing occurs when prior prosocial behavior gives people “license” to subsequently engage in less moral or helpful actions (Khan and Dhar 2006, 2007; Mazar and Zhong 2011; Monin and Miller 2001). In the consumer setting, for example, Khan and Dhar (2006) found that after consumers imagined engaging in community-service activities, they were more likely to choose luxury over necessity products and less likely to donate part or all of their participation payment to charity. The literature on moral licensing would predict that engaging in an initial act of token support for a cause will lead to a decreased propensity to make future meaningful contributions to the cause. Recent consumer research on prosocial behavior also supports this prediction. In an investigation of cause marketing programs, Krishna (2011) found that consumers donated less to a charity after purchasing a cause-marketing product (vs. the same product without donation).

## Lex – Palliative

Inclusion in the debate space is a empty act of tolerance that ensures that nothing really changes **Zizek 8**—Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana (Slavoj, The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, Int’l Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 5;1)

ellipses in orig

Let us take two predominant topics of to day's American radical academia: postcolonial and queer (gay) studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, "postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness," so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas ... The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included – up to a point), but conceptual: notions of "European" critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic. ¶ My personal experience is that practically all of the "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with the secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play on the stock market). If there is a thing they are gen­uinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environ­ment of the "symbolic classes" in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism, Third World sweatshops, etc., is thus ultimately a defense against their own innermost identi­fication, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: "Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change!" Symptomatic here is the journal October: when you ask one of the editors to what the title refers, they will half-confidentially signal that it is, of course, that October – in this way, one can indulge in the jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the hidden assurance that one is somehow retaining the link with the radical revolutionary past ... With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game straight and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates, in contrast to the pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt toward the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while their own radi­cality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to any­thing determinate.¶ II. From Human to Animal Rights ¶ We live in the "postmodern" era in which truth­ claims as such are dismissed as an expression of hidden power mechanisms – as the reborn pseudo-Nietzscheans like to emphasize, truth is a lie which is most efficient in asserting our will to power. The very question "Is it true?" apropos of some statement is supplanted by another question: "Under what power con­ditions can this statement be uttered?" What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of perspectives, or, as it is fashionable to put it today, of "narratives" – not only of literature, but also of politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, stories we tell ourselves about ourselves**,** and the ultimate goal of ethics is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist**,** in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell his/her story. The two philosophers of today's global capitalism are the two great Left-liberal "progres­sives," Richard Rorty and Peter Singer – honest in their respective stances. Rorty defines the basic coordinates: the fundamental dimension of a human being is the ability to suffer, to experience pain and humiliation – consequently, since humans are symbolic animals, the fundamental right is the right to nar­rate one's experience of suffering and humiliation.2 Singer then provides the Darwinian background.3

They make the ballot a commodity that makes social transformation impossible

**Bryant 13**—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/>)

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, itfunctions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries outits autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system**–** despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work **–**but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic politicaltheory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse. The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has

# Other Cards

Hollywood constructs the muslim other **ahmad ‘14**

The corporate media’s increasing demonization of Islam and Muslims is not occurring in a silo, but is being driven very much by the agendas of government and security agencies. On the one hand, the corporate media relies relatively uncritically on government and security agencies for its information on foreign policy and intelligence matters, including terrorism.28 On the other, there have been direct efforts from security agencies to influence the media. Since 1990, for instance, the Pentagon has bribed, pressured, and censored Hollywood film-makers to adapt story lines to support its propaganda.29 Reviewing over a thousand Hollywood movies, Jack Shaheen, Professor Emeritus of Mass Communication at Southern-Illinois University, found that: “Today’s image makers regularly link the Islamic faith with male supremacy, holy war, and acts of terror, depicting Arab Muslims as hostile alien intruders, and as lecherous, oily sheikhs, intent on using nuclear weapons. When mosques are displayed onscreen, the camera inevitably cuts to Arabs praying, and then gunning down civilians.”30

Here, the mainstream media plays a critical function in ideologically linking the international to the domestic, in particular, the trajectory of Western foreign policy in Muslim-majority theatres across the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as the processes of Islamophobia and radicalisation experienced within Muslim diaspora communities in the West. On the one hand, Islamophobic media narratives buttress anti-Muslim public opinion at home, alienating Muslims and fuelling the extremist rhetoric of far right groups. Simultaneously, images of devastation and destruction from Muslim-majority theatres of war such as Iraq and Afghanistan also distress and anger Muslim diaspora communities, further exacerbating alienation. In effect, the media acts as a symbiotic link between Islamophobia at home and abroad, as it mediates extremist rhetoric from neoconservative and right-wing factions and the official language of government and security agencies who attempt to pander to Islamophobic public opinion on political issues such as immigration and terrorism.

1. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed [British author, investigative journalist, and international security scholar. He is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development] “Islamophobia and Insecurity”, in Abdelwahab El Affendi Osman (ed.) Killer Narratives: The Destructive Impact of Collective Nightmares (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. FOSTER (John Bellamy Foster Professor of Sociology University of Oregon Monthly Review Foundation “Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism” Monthly Review https://monthlyreview.org/2008/07/01/peak-oil-and-energy-imperialism/ ZA) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Andrew Schaap [University of Exeter, BA(Hons) Melbourne, MSc, PhD Edinburgh, teaches contemporary political theory and critical IR theory, "Agonism in divided societies" Published in Philosophy and Social Criticism 32(2) (2006): 255-277. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Bleiker, Roland. 2008, Professor of IR at U of Queensland, The New Pluralism, pg. 140 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Honig, Bonnie. Professor-Elect of Modern Culture and Media and Political Science at Brown University. Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 15-16 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)